
**Information technology — Security
techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT
security —**

**Part 2:
Security functional components**

*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Critères
d'évaluation pour la sécurité TI —*

Partie 2: Composants fonctionnels de sécurité

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Foreword

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The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

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This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO/IEC 15408-2:2005), which has been technically revised.

ISO/IEC 15408 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security*:

- Part 1: *Introduction and general model*
- Part 2: *Security functional components*
- Part 3: *Security assurance components*

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Withdrawn

Introduction

Security functional components, as defined in this part of ISO/IEC 15408, are the basis for the security functional requirements expressed in a Protection Profile (PP) or a Security Target (ST). These requirements describe the desired security behaviour expected of a Target of Evaluation (TOE) and are intended to meet the security objectives as stated in a PP or an ST. These requirements describe security properties that users can detect by direct interaction (i.e. inputs, outputs) with the IT or by the IT response to stimulus.

Security functional components express security requirements intended to counter threats in the assumed operating environment of the TOE and/or cover any identified organisational security policies and assumptions.

The audience for this part of ISO/IEC 15408 includes consumers, developers, and evaluators of secure IT products. ISO/IEC 15408-1 Clause 5 provides additional information on the target audience of ISO/IEC 15408, and on the use of ISO/IEC 15408 by the groups that comprise the target audience. These groups may use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 as follows:

- a) Consumers, who use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 when selecting components to express functional requirements to satisfy the security objectives expressed in a PP or ST. ISO/IEC 15408-1 provides more detailed information on the relationship between security objectives and security requirements.
- b) Developers, who respond to actual or perceived consumer security requirements in constructing a TOE, may find a standardised method to understand those requirements in this part of ISO/IEC 15408. They can also use the contents of this part of ISO/IEC 15408 as a basis for further defining the TOE security functionality and mechanisms that comply with those requirements.
- c) Evaluators, who use the functional requirements defined in this part of ISO/IEC 15408 in verifying that the TOE functional requirements expressed in the PP or ST satisfy the IT security objectives and that all dependencies are accounted for and shown to be satisfied. Evaluators also should use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 to assist in determining whether a given TOE satisfies stated requirements.

Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security —

Part 2: Security functional components

1 Scope

This part of ISO/IEC 15408 defines the required structure and content of security functional components for the purpose of security evaluation. It includes a catalogue of functional components that will meet the common security functionality requirements of many IT products.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 15408-1, *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general model*