Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security –
Part 12: Resilience and security recommendations for power systems with distributed energy resources (DER) cyber-physical systems
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### Table A.1 – NIST Smart Grid Security Requirements Families

### Table A.2 – Detailed NIST Catalogue of Smart Grid Security Requirements

### Table C.1 – Mapping between IEC 62443-3-3, NISTIR 7628, and IEC TR 62351-12

### Table C.2 – IEC 62351-12 cyber security items not mapped to all guidelines
FOREWORD

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IEC TR 62351-12, which is a technical report, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 57: Power systems management and associated information exchange.
The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enquiry draft</th>
<th>Report on voting</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57/1637/DTR</td>
<td>57/1664/RVC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts of the IEC 62351 series, under the general title: *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

**IMPORTANT** – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a colour printer.
INTRODUCTION

Resilience and Cyber Security

In the energy sector, two key phrases are becoming the focus of international and national policies: “grid resilience” and “cyber security of the cyber-physical grid”. Grid resilience responds to the overarching concern: "The critical infrastructure, the Smart Electric Grid, must be resilient – to be protected against both physical and cyber problems when possible, but also to cope with and recover from the inevitable disruptive event, no matter what the cause of that problem is – cyber, physical, malicious, or inadvertent."

"Grid resilience … includes hardening, advanced capabilities, and recovery/reconstitution. Although most attention is placed on best practices for hardening, resilience strategies must also consider options to improve grid flexibility and control."¹ Resilience of the grid is often associated with making the grid able to withstand and recover from severe weather and other physical events, but resilience should also include the ability of the cyber-physical grid to withstand and recover from malicious and inadvertent cyber events.

Resilience, sometimes defined as “the fast recovery with continued operations from any type of disruption” can be applied to the power system critical infrastructure. A resilient power system is designed and operated not only to prevent and withstand malicious attacks and inadvertent failures, but also to detect, assess, cope with, recover from, and eventually analyze such attacks and failures in a timely manner while continuing to respond to any additional threats.

The “cyber-physical grid” implies that the power system consists of both cyber and physical assets that are tightly intertwined. Both the cyber assets and the physical assets must be protected in order for the grid to be resilient. But protection of these assets is not enough: these cyber and physical assets must also be used in combination to cope with and recover from both cyber and physical attacks into order to truly improve the resilience of the power system infrastructure.

Background to Resilience Issues

All too often, cyber security experts concentrate only on traditional “IT cyber security” for protecting the cyber assets, without focusing on the overall resilience of the physical systems. At the same time, power system experts concentrate only on traditional “power system security” based on the engineering design and operational strategies that keep the physical and electrical assets safe and functioning correctly, without focusing on the security of the cyber assets. However, the two must be combined: resilience of the overall cyber-physical system must include tightly entwined cyber security technologies and physical asset engineering and operations, combined with risk management to ensure appropriate levels of mitigation strategies.

As an example, distributed energy resources (DER) systems are cyber-physical systems that are increasingly being interconnected to the distribution power system to provide energy and ancillary services. However, distribution power systems were not originally designed to handle these dispersed sources of generation, while DER systems are generally not under direct utility management or under the security policies and procedures of the utilities. Many DER systems provide energy from renewable sources, which are not reliably available at all times. Therefore, the resilience of power systems to even typical disruptions is increasingly at risk as more of these DER systems are interconnected.

On the other hand, the sophisticated cyber-physical capabilities of smart DER systems could actually improve power system resilience if these smart DER capabilities were properly secure and coordinated with power system management through communications. DER systems can actually compensate for some of the problems they cause, such as riding through temporary spikes and dips in voltage or frequency that could be caused by their fluctuating behavior. DER functions such as volt-VAr management can smooth these fluctuations as well. In addition, networked DER systems (e.g. microgrids), and the bulk power system can serve as mutual backups during excessive peak loads or during disaster conditions. As illustrated in Figure 1, if both the cyber and the physical components of these DER systems were well designed and implemented with embedded cyber security, and were interconnected and operated using good engineering strategies, they would significantly improve the resilience of the power system.

It is not just the utilities who must take responsibility for achieving this resilience goal. Many stakeholders are involved in the design, implementation, and operation of DER systems, including manufacturers, integrator/installers, users, information and communication technology (ICT) providers, security managers, testing and maintenance personnel, and ultimately utility regulators. However, given this new cyber-physical environment, often these stakeholders do not fully understand or appreciate the types of cyber security and engineering strategies that could or should be used.
POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

Part 12: Resilience and security recommendations for power systems with distributed energy resources (DER) cyber-physical systems

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62351, which is a technical report, discusses cyber security recommendations and engineering/operational strategies for improving the resilience of power systems with interconnected Distributed Energy Resources (DER) systems. It covers the resilience requirements for the many different stakeholders of these dispersed cyber-physical generation and storage devices, with the goal of enhancing the safety, reliability, power quality, and other operational aspects of power systems, particularly those with high penetrations of DER systems.

The focus of this technical report is describing the impact of DER systems on power system resilience, and covers the cyber security and engineering strategies for improving power system resilience with high penetrations of DER systems.

While recognizing that many other requirements exist for improving power system resilience, this technical report does not address general power system configurations, operations, manual power restoration activities or the many other non-DER-specific issues. For instance, power system reliability relies on well-coordinated protective relays, stable power system designs, and well-trained field crews, while control center cyber security relies on many best practices for communication network design and firewalls. However, this technical report only addresses the additional reliability and resilience issues caused by 3rd-party managed DER systems which may not be as well-secured or operated with the same reliability as the utility-managed power system.

This technical report discusses the resilience issues for cyber-physical DER systems interconnected with the power grid, building on the concepts and the hierarchical architecture described in the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) draft DRGS Subgroup B White Paper – Categorizing Use Cases in Hierarchical DER Systems 01-14-2014.docx.

2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62351-9, Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 9: Cyber security key management for power system equipment


Under consideration.
3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

NOTE For the sake of transparency certain terms, taken from different sources, are provided with slightly different definitions in Annex D, Glossary of terms.

3.1 anti-islanding
detecting an island and ceasing to energize that island

3.2 cease to energize
cessation of energy outflow capability

[SOURCE: IEEE 1547:2003]

3.3 cyber-physical systems
engineered systems that are built from and depend upon the synergy of computational and physical components

[SOURCE: National Science Foundation]

3.4 electric power system
EPS
facilities that deliver electric power to a load

Note 1 to entry: This may include generation units.

[SOURCE: IEEE 1547:2003]

3.5 electric power system, area
area EPS
electric power system (EPS) that serves Local EPSs

Note 1 to entry: Typically, an Area EPS has primary access to public rights-of-way, priority crossing of property boundaries, etc. and is subject to regulatory oversight.

[SOURCE: IEEE 1547:2003]

3.6 electric power system, local
local EPS
EPS contained entirely within a single premises or group of premises

[SOURCE: IEEE 1547:2003]