



TECHNICAL REPORT



**Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security –
Part 90-2: Deep packet inspection of encrypted communications**

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

Part 90-2: Deep packet inspection of encrypted communications

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IEC TR 62351-90-2, which is a technical report, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 57: Power systems management and associated information exchange.

The text of this Technical Report is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
57/1939/DTR	57/2002/RVDTR

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This document has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts in the IEC 62351 series, published under the general title *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

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INTRODUCTION

This part of IEC 62351, which is a technical report, analyses the impact of encrypted communication channels in power systems introduced with the IEC 62351 series. As defined in IEC 62351 an encrypted channel can be employed when communicating with IEDs and encryption can be adopted at message level as well. For example, the use of encrypting TLS setups according to IEC 62351-3 introduces some difficulties when Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is needed to inspect the communication channel for monitoring, auditing and validation needs.

In this document different techniques are analyzed that can be employed to circumvent these issues when DPI of communications is required.

POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

Part 90-2: Deep packet inspection of encrypted communications

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62351, which is a technical report, addresses the need to perform Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) on communication channels secured by IEC 62351. The main focus is the illustration of the state-of-the-art of DPI techniques that can be applied to the various kinds of channels, highlighting the possible security risks and implementation costs. Additional, beyond state-of-the-art proposals are also described in order to circumvent the main limits of existing solutions.

It is to be noted that some communications secured by IEC 62351 are not encrypted, but only add integrity and non-repudiation of the message – however they are mentioned here for the sake of completeness around IEC 62351 and DPI.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62351-3, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 3: Communication network and system security – Profiles including TCP/IP*

IEC TS 62351-4, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 4: Profiles including MMS*

IEC TS 62351-5, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives*

IEC TS 62351-6, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 6: Security for IEC 61850*

IEC 62351-7, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 7: Network and System Management (NSM) data object models*

IEC TS 62351-8, *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security – Part 8: Role-based access control*